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set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses. The 
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adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of 
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evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
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not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In this Brief, the Plaintiff, who is the Respondent to 
the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, will be referred to as 
Miller. The Third-Party Defendant William J. Colman will be 
referred to as Colman. A principal witness in this case was 
Frank J. Allen, an attorney authorized to practice in the State 
of Utah, and he will be referred to herein as Allen. The Utah 
Court of Appeals will be referred to as the Court of Appeals. 
Reference to the Transcript of the Trial Court's proceedings 
will be designated as "T". Reference to the Trial Court's 
Findings of Fact will be designated as ffFOFff. Petitioners will 
be referred to as Appellants. All emphasis is added. A copy 
of the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment and Decree, of the Court of Appeals1 Decision and 
of Colman's Affidavit (Ex. p. 28) are appended hereto. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of this case as found by the Trial Court and 
affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals are as follows: 
The property subject of this action is an 1840.14 acre 
tract with appurtenant water rights located in Cache County, 
Utah, commonly known as the Anderson Ranch (hereafter "the 
Ranch") (FOF No. 1). In 1981, the Ranch was owned by Royalty 
Investment, a corporation controlled by Colman (FOF No. 3). At 
this same time, Colman was the President of Owanah Oil 
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Corporation (Owanah), which owned certain mineral rights in 
Churchill County, Nevada known as the "Carson Sink Salt 
Project" (FOF No. 4). 
Colman urgently needed money to further development of the 
Carson Sink Project and in the late summer or early fall of 
1981 approached Appellants about a loan of $750,000.00, offer-
ing to secure the loan by the Ranch (FOF No. 4). Appellants 
declined. Colman then offered Appellants a limited partnership 
investment in Carson Sink and an interest in the Ranch. After 
consulting with their accountants, Appellants offered to make 
$500,000.00 available to Colman if a transaction could be 
structured as follows: (1) a $250,000.00 investment in the 
limited partnership, providing research and development tax 
write-offs, an interest in profits during the life of the 
partnership, and an overriding royalty thereafter, and (2) cash 
payment of $250,000.00 as the purchase price of the Ranch, 
coupled with a one-year option under which Colman could 
repurchase the ranch for $600,000.00, allowing Appellants to 
treat the dollar return if the option to purchase was exercised 
as capital gain (FOF No. 7). The term of the Option was later 
extended to a year and one-half and the price was increased to 
$650,000.00 (FOF No. 9). The one (l) year option for 
$600,000.00 was never signed (FOF No. 9). 
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Allen, Colman's attorney, drafted the documents according 
to this plan. Allen structured the deal as three separate 
transactions in order to achieve the tax advantages Appellants 
sought: (1) a limited partnership interest; (2) the purchase 
of the Ranch for $250,000.00; and (3) a one-year option to 
repurchase the Ranch for $650,000.00. All three (3) documents 
were prepared and signed at the same time in Allen's office as 
part of an integrated transaction (FOF No. 15). 
The Option states that it was given to Colman "in 
consideration of the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5000.00) 
and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which 
is hereby acknowledged.ff Allen testified that the recital of 
"$5000.00 and other good and valuable consideration the receipt 
of which is hereby acknowledged11 was inserted by him merely as 
a legal shorthand for the true consideration. He testified the 
$5,000.00 was never intended to be the actual consideration for 
the Option and that is why the recital indicated that $5,000.00 
and other good and valuable consideration had been paid. Allen 
further testified that the real consideration for the Option 
was the execution of the limited partnership agreement, the 
Ranch agreement, and the various tax benefits accruing to 
Appellants by the structuring of the deal (FOF No. 21). 
Colman did not pay $5,000.00 to Appellants for the Option. 
Appellants made various verbal inquiries regarding payment 
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after the date on the face of the Option, to which Colman 
responded he did not believe he had to pay the $5,000.00 based 
on the advice of Allen (FOF No. 25). 
On November 2, 1982, Colman executed a Real Estate 
Contract which assigned his rights under the Option to Miller 
when Colman could not secure the $650,000.00 necessary to 
exercise the Option himself (FOF No. 36 and No. 37). 
Subsequently, Appellants received written notice of this 
assignment and contacted Miller to inform him that the 
$5,000.00 for the Option had never been paid by Colman (FOF No. 
42). In addition, despite the lack of payment, Archer stated 
that he and Wolfe were still willing to sell the Ranch to 
Miller for a purchase price of $655,000.00 (FOF No. 42). 
Negotiations for this sale occurred, but it was never 
consummated (FOF No. 43). 
On April 8, 1983, Appellants attempted to revoke the 
Option (FOF No. 44). Subsequently, Miller, Colman and Allen 
met and discussed the status of the Option and all agreed that 
the $5,000.00 was never intended to be paid, but merely 
functioned as window-dressing. The true consideration 
consisted of the structuring of the transaction for Appellants' 
tax advantage. Allen and Colman executed affidavits to this 
effect following this meeting (FOF No. 45 and Ex. p. 27 and p. 
28). In his Affidavit, Colman stated: 
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"6. All of the papers for the three transactions 
which made up our total deal were completed before we ever 
signed the limited partnership agreement and it was agreed 
that the ranch purchase instruments would be dated about 3 
months after the limited partnership certificate, and the 
option about three months after the purchase. Archer and 
Wolfe acknowledged that they had received the 
consideration for the option because that was a part of 
the total deal we had made. The whole concept of our 
agreement was that Archer and Wolfe would realize a 20% 
return on a $500,000 investment and would be able to show 
that return as capital gain as well as show $250,000 as 
expenses in 1981 and 1982. (Ex. p. 28, paragraph 6) 
On May 16, 1983, Miller filed this action against 
Appellants and a Lis Pendens against the Ranch. Appellants 
later filed a Third-Party Complaint against Colman. On July 1, 
1983, Miller tendered to Appellants a cashier's check for 
$650,000.00 as an exercise of the Option to purchase the Ranch 
and the tender was refused. The check was then deposited with 
the Clerk of the Court who deposited it in an interest-bearing 
account, with the entitlement to interest to be determined by 
the court (F0F No. 54 and No. 55). Since Miller's July 1, 1983 
tender and until this case was affirmed by the Court of 
Appeals, Appellants held possession and all rights of ownership 
to the Ranch (FOF No. 67). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Rule 43 of the Rules of the Supreme Court (R0SC) sets 
forth the standard for review on a Writ of Certiorari and 
provides: 
"Rule 43. Considerations governing review of certiorari. 
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"Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of 
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted 
only when there are special and important reasons 
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor 
wholly measuring the court's discretion, indicate the 
character of reasons that will be considered: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered 
a decision in conflict with a decision of another panel of 
the Court of Appeals on the same issue of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided 
a question of state or federal law in a way that is in 
conflict with a decision of this court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered 
a decision that has so far departed from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far 
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call 
for an exercise of this court's power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an 
important question of municipal, state, or federal law 
which has not been, but should be, settled by this 
court." 
ARGUMENT 
Measured by the above standards of review, the Petition of 
Appellants for Certiorari is without merit. 
Appellants raise four (4) questions for review. (See 
pages 1 and 2 of Petitioners' Brief.) Each question in effect 
requests this Court to review the Findings of Fact of the Trial 
Court. The Court of Appeals has already reviewed the Trial 
Court's Findings of Fact and affirmed them. This the Court of 
Appeals had the duty to do unless the Trial Court's Findings of 
Fact were clearly eroneous (Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure). Petitioners now request the Court to make a second 
review of the Trial Court's Findings. 
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1. Appellants contend in their first question for review 
that the testimony of Allen relied upon by the Court of Appeals 
as the "substantial evidence11 in support of the Trial Courtfs 
ruling does not exist. The answer to this assertion is 
two-fold: 
(a) First, a citation from the record testimony of Allen 
shows such evidence does exist. Allen testified: 
"Q. Why did you use the figure $5,000 in that 
instrument?" 
"A. I thought it important to use, to express a con-
sideration, because an option, in my judgment, is not 
enforceable unless it is granted for adequate consid-
eration. It was appropriate, i^f 1^  were to comply with the 
desires of the parties that none of these instruments 
should "reTer to the "others, it is appropriate to state the 
consideration in terms of Dollars." (T., page 64, lines 
16-22) 
It is clear that Appellants did not want to leave a paper 
trail for the Internal Revenue Service to follow in this 
transaction for fear that the Internal Revenue Service, seeing 
the paper trail, would look past the form of the transaction to 
its substance and disallow some of Appellants tax benefits from 
the deal. Referring in the Option to the capital gain 
benefits, royalty overrides and expense write-offs as 
consideration would have left such a paper trail. For this 
reason, Allen, in order ,fto comply with the desires of the 
parties that none of these instruments should refer to the 
others ...ff, carried out the parties' desires and intent by 
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quantifying the consideration as f,$5,000 and other good and 
valuable consideration" (not $5,000.00 only as Appellants are 
want to point out). 
(b) Secondly, the consideration for the Option was not 
$5,000.00. It was "$5000 and other good and valuable 
consideration.ff Allen's testimony makes it clear that 
Appellants would not have advanced the money for the 
partnership without having the contract on the Ranch signed and 
Colman would not sign the Ranch contract unless he had an 
option to repurchase the Ranch. Allen testified: 
"A. ... My recollection is that Wolfe, neither Wolfe nor 
Archer made any contribution to the limited partnership 
until he was sure that he had the right to acquire the 
Anderson Ranch for the $250,000 stated in that agreement. 
..." (T., page 68, lines 8-12) 
ffQ. Did you advise Mr. Colman on the question of whether 
or not he should enter into the transaction for the sale 
of the property without an option back to buy it? 
"A. Yes, I did. 
"Q. What was that advice? 
"A. Well, I advised him that he would be in a very poor 
position to demand the right to repurchase the ranch 
unless he had in his hand the instrument which gave him 
the right before he executed the contract for its sale. 
"Q. Was it on that basis that you then executed these 
three documents, 3, 4, and 8, simultaneously? 
"A. Well, of course, I didn't execute them. 
ffQ. They were executed? 
"A. It was on that basis that I did what I could to 
influence the parties to execute those instruments all at 
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the same time. So each of them had the necessary—what I 
considered to be the necessary assurance that the only one 
would perform the whole deal, the whole package at the 
time the first of the instruments were executed." (T., 
page 68, lines 17-25, and page 69, lines 1-13) 
2. Appellants next contend that there was a necessity of 
a finding by the Trial Court of ambiguity in the term ff$5000 
and other good and valuable consideration11 before parol 
evidence could be used to explain the term "other good and 
valuable consideration.ff The term "$5000" is not ambiguous. 
The term "other good and valuable consideration" is ambiguous. 
To explain what the other "good and valuable consideration" was 
does not alter the instrument in violation of the parol 
evidence rule as Appellants contend. This Court stated in 
Falkner vs. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292 (1983): 
"When a contract is ambiguous, because of the uncertain 
meaning of terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies, parol evidence is admissable to explain the 
parties f intent." 
The testimony of Allen amply "explained the parties1 
intent" in using the terms "other good and valuable 
consideration." 
Even if the $5,000.00 were to have been paid (which there 
is evidence from the testimonies of both Allen and Colman was 
not the case) and was not paid, there were other considerations 
to support the Option, to-wit: the tax and other benefits to 
Appellants in the transaction and the sale of the Ranch itself. 
Where one of two considerations for a contract is for any 
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reason insufficient, but not illegal, the other 
consideration, if sufficient, will suffice to uphold the 
contract. Luther v. National Bank of Commerce, 98 P.2d 667 
(Wash. 1940) and U. S. v. Schaefer, 319 E.2d 907 (9th Circuit 
1963). In addition, sufficient consideration for an option was 
supplied solely by the original sales transaction of which the 
repurchase option was a part. (Commuter Development 
Investment v. Granlich, 279 N.W.2d 394 (Nebraska 1979, and 
Gerald Elbon, Inc. v. Seegren, 338 N.E.2d 626 (Illinois 1978)) 
Appellants1 argument on this point lacks candor. The 
Option states "$5000 and other good and valuable consideration, 
receipt of which is hereby acknowledged.ff Appellants seek to 
void the language "receipt of which is hereby acknowledged11 by 
introducing parol while at the same time contending Miller 
cannot use parol to show the meaning of "other good and 
valuable consideration". 
3. Appellants next contend that the Court should grant 
certiorari to review the question of whether certain evidence, 
particularly notes made by Colman, were admissible and attempt 
to make both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals1 action 
on this issue an interpretation of Rule 106 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence. 
The answer to this contention is first that the notes were 
not admitted as evidence but only for impeachment purposes. 
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(See the handwritten interlineation in the Conclusion of 
Law No. 14 by Judge Call.) The notes were not the only source 
of impeaching Colman's testimony. His testimony was also 
impeached by his affidavit (Ex. 28) and his deposition. (See 
FOF No. 33.) Secondly, the Trial Court specifically found that 
"... Colman's ... handwritten notes are not strictly necessary 
to the Court's decision herein ..." (FOF No. 33). Thus, if 
admission of the notes was error, the error had no effect on 
the Court's decision and is therefore harmless and not a basis 
for reversing the judgments. 
Appellants have urged upon the Trial Court, the Court of 
Appeals, and now upon this Court that the Trial Court's 
Findings and Decree make the deed given by Colman to Appellants 
in effect a mortgage (see Appellants' Brief p. 11). This is 
not the holding of the Trial Court but is a fiction 
manufactured by Appellants. The decision of the Trial Court as 
affirmed by the Court of Appeals gives full effect to all three 
(3) instruments, the limited partnership agreement, the 
contract and the option, and merely enforces the option. 
Appellants got all they bargained for in the transaction, the 
benefits of the partnership, and $650,000.00 cash back. 
4. Appellants' final contention is that by allowing 
Miller the interest accrued on the $650,000.00 deposited to 
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exercise the Option, the Court of Appeals held contrary to 
this Court's ruling in Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427 (Utah 
1980). 
Eliason is factually different from the case at Bar. In 
Eliason, the buyer tendered the money required by the contract 
and the tender was refused. During the pendency of the action, 
buyer then retained the tendered money for his own use. In 
addition, in Eliason, the buyer, in his suit for specific 
performance, also sued for damages in the form of the rentals 
he was deprived of. 
In the case at Bar, the buyer (Miller) actually tendered 
his money into Court and thereby was deprived of its use during 
the pendency of this action. Miller had neither use of his 
money or use of the property. Appellants on the other hand had 
full use of the property and collected the rentals therefrom. 
Appellants were thus placed in position of enjoying all 
economic benefits from the Ranch until possession was delivered 
to Miller. 
This is not a case where Eliason applies, and the Court of 
Appeals correctly so held. In the Eliason case, buyer sought 
the rents. In this case, the buyer does not seek the rents. 
The Court of Appeals correctly concluded: 
"Common law and equity require that if a party 
obligated to sell land retains possession, forcing the 
buyer to place funds on deposit with the court pending 
settlement of the action, then the seller is not entitled 
to the accrued interest on the deposited funds." 
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following Rasmusson v. Moe, 292 P.2d 226 (Cal. 1956) and 
Resnick v. Goldman, 133 So. 2nd 770 (Fla. 1961). 
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court in Ellis v. Mihelis, 384 
P.2d 7 (Utah 1963) expressly noted an exception to the rule in 
the Ellis case when "... the purchaser has, with notice to the 
seller, set aside money toward the purchase price in such a 
manner as to realize no use or benefit therefor.11 (ibid., page 
16) Miller fits this exception, having set aside with the 
Clerk of the Court the $650,000.00 purchase price so as to 
realize no use or benefit therefrom. 
CONCLUSION 
This case, while of great importance to the litigants, is 
of no great consequence to the body of law of this state. The 
case was decided on settled legal principals adequately 
reviewed on established principals of appellate review by an 
appellate court. The decision of the Court of Appeals was not 
in conflict with any decision of any other panel of the Court 
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals did not decide a question of 
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with 
decisions of this Court. The decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals does not depart from any accepted course of judicial 
proceedings. There is no important question of municipal, 
state or federal law to be settled by this Court. The 
Appellants have advanced no "special and important reasons" for 
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issuing the requested writ. Nor have Appellants advanced 
any reason within the framework of the "character of reasons" 
set forth in Rule 43 of the ROSC why this Court should grant 
certiorari. On the other hand, Miller has shown that each 
contention of Appellants has been reviewed, considered, and is 
supported by the evidence in the record and by the law 
applicable thereto. The requested Writ of Certiorari should 
therefore be denied. 
DATED this 10th day of May, 1988. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
£ L. Brent Hoggan 
Attorneys for Plai' 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct 
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Appellants1 Petition For Writ of Certiorari to: 
E. Craig Smay 
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Attorneys for Appellants 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, this 10th day of May, 1988. 
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L. Brent Hoggan 
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7PJ PACIFIC KEPOKTEK. 2d SERIES 
Ernest J. MILLER. Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
John D. ARCHER and Elizabeth 15. Arch-
er, both individually and ns Trustees 
for the Elizabeth Daly Archer Trust, 
and Hubert Wolfe, Judy W. Wolfe, and 
Elliott Wolfe, as Trustees for Elliott 
Wolfe Trust No. 701, Defendants and 
Appellants. 
John D. ARCHER and Elizabeth B. Arch-
er, both individually and as Trustees 
for the Elizabeth Daly Archer Trust, 
and Hubert Wolfe, Judy W. Wolfe, and 
Elliott Wolfe, an Trustees for Elliott 
Wolfe Trust No. 701, Third-Party Plain-
tiffs, 
v. 
William J. COLMAN, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
No. 860371-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah 
Feb. 10, 1988. 
Appeal was taken from order of the 
District Court, Box Elder County, Omer J. 
Call, J., ordering specific performance of 
option to buy land in favor of option hold-
er's assignee and awarding accrued inter-
est to assignee. The Court of Appeals, 
Billings, J., held that: (1) substantial evi-
dence supported finding that recital in real 
estate option contract acknowledging re-
ceipt of "$5,000 and other good and valu-
able consideration" was nominal considera-
tion inserted by drafter of agreement for 
convenience; (2) evidence established that 
structure of real estate transaction was 
intended consideration for real estate op-
tion agreement; and (3) option holder's as-
signee was entitled to accruing interest on 
money deposited with clerk of court after 
parties who gave option refused tender of 
payment by assignee and retained posses-
sion of subject real estate. 
Affirmed. 
MIIJJ;H 
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1. Evidence <£=>432 
Even if written agreement appears to 
be completely integrated, parol evidence is 
admissible to establish whether there was 
consideration for a promise 
2. Contracts <s=>82 
Recital of consideration received is 
usually intended merely as written ac-
knowledgment of distinct act of payment, 
it is inserted for convenience, usually be-
cause parties do not want to reveal real 
consideration. 
3. Evidence <*=>419(1) 
Parol evidence rule does not prevent 
party from showing actual consideration 
when nominal consideration is recited. 
4. Vendor and Purchaser «=*44 
Substantial evidence supported finding 
that recital in real estate option contract 
acknowledging receipt of "$5,000 and other 
good and valuable consideration" was nom-
inal consideration inserted by drafter for 
convenience because parties did not wish to 
reveal in writing true consideration; option 
holder's attorney testified that he had con-
sistently informed parties that he had in-
serted $5,000 amount on his own, intending 
it as legal shorthand for true consideration 
and was not an item for which parties 
bargained. 
5. Evidence <*=>419(13) 
After determining that receipt of 
$5,000 recited in real estate option agree-
ment was not true consideration for option, 
trial court could consider parol evidence to 
disclose true meaning of provision in agree-
ment referring to "other good and valuable 
consideration." 
6. Vendor and Purchaser <£=»44 
Evidence established that execution of 
documents conveying ranch and limited 
partnership interest*, together with gener-
al tax structure of real estate transaction, 
was intended consideration for real estate 
option agreement 
7. Vendor and Purchaser 4=>44 
Evidence supported finding that origi-
nal one-year option agreement was never 
finalized and that agreement establishing 
\KCIIEK Utah 1275 
274 (UfuhApp. 1988) 
one and one-half-year option was not a new 
agreement that required new consideration. 
8. Contracts <e=103 
Deeds «=*17(1) 
Partnership «=*352 
Finding that limited partnership agree-
ment, purchase contract and special war-
ranty deed were intended consideration for 
option agreement did not impair validity of 
partnership agreement, contract or deed. 
9. Witnesses <s=>379(2) 
Copies of option holder's handwritten 
notes made during contract negotiations 
were admissible for impeachment purposes 
in an action challenging agreement's validi-
ty. Rules of Evid., Rule 801(dXlXA). 
10. Interest «=>20 
Option holder's assignee was entitled 
to accruing interest on money deposited 
with clerk of court after parties who gave 
option refused tender of payment by as-
signee and retained possession of subject 
real estate. 
11. Interest «=>20 
If party obligated to sell land retains 
possession, forcing buyer to place funds on 
deposit with court pending settlement of 
action, then seller is not entitled to accrued 
interest on deposited funds. 
E. Craig Smay, Sessions & Moore, Salt 
Lake City, for defendants and appellants. 
William L. Fillmore, L. Brent Hoggan 
(argued), Marlin J. Grant, Olson & Hoggan, 
Logan, for plaintiff and respondent 
Before BILLINGS, DAVIDSON and 
GARFF, JJ. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Appellants John D. Archer and Elizabeth 
B. Archer, both individually and as Trust-
ees for the Elizabeth Daly Archer Trust, 
and Hubert Wolfe, Judy W. Wolfe, and 
Elliott Wolfe, as Trustees for Elliott Wolfe 
Trust No. 701 ("Archer" and/or "Wolfe"), 
appeal from the trial court's judgment or-
dering specific performance of an option to 
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buy land in favor of Respondent Ernest J. 
Miller ("Miller"), and from the award of 
accrued interest to Miller. We affirm. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Miller's action for specific performance 
against Archer and Wolfe arises out of an 
earlier business relationship between Arch-
er, Wolfe, and William J. Colman, the third-
party defendant ("Colman"). Because it is 
integral to our decision, we set out in detail 
the factual background of this complex 
transaction. On appeal, we view the facts 
in the light most favorable to the trial 
court's findings. See Security State Bank 
v. Broadhead, 734 P.2d 469, 470-71 (Utah 
1987). 
In the late summer or early fall of 1981, 
Colman approached Archer and Wolfe for a 
loan of $750,000. Colman urgently needed 
the money to continue development of a 
business venture. Archer advised Colman 
that he and Wolfe were not interested in a 
simple loan due to the adverse tax conse-
quences resulting from interest income, nor 
would they invest the $750,000 amount re-
quested. Colman then offered Archer and 
Wolfe a limited partnership interest in a 
salt project known as "Carson Sink" in 
Nevada ("limited partnership"), and an in-
terest in "Anderson Ranch" which Colman 
owned. 
After consulting with their accountants 
about the tax consequences, Archer and 
Wolfe told Colman they would advance a 
total of $500,000, on the condition that the 
deal was structured as follows: (1) a $250,-
000 investment in the limited partnership, 
providing research and development tax 
write-offs, an interest in profits during the 
life of the partnership, and an overriding 
royalty thereafter, and (2) cash payment of 
$250,000 as the purchase price of the 
Anderson Ranch, coupled with a one-year 
option under which Colman could repur-
chase the ranch for $600,000, allowing 
Archer and Wolfe to treat the dollar return 
as capital gain. 
Frank J. ABen (" Allen"), Colman's attor-
ney, drafted the documents according to 
this plan. Allen structured the deal as 
three separate transactions in order to 
achieve the tax advantages Archer and 
Woffe sought: (1) a limited partnership in-
terest; (2) the purchase of Anderson 
Ranch; and (3) a one-year option to repur-
chase Anderson Ranch. 
Before the documents were executed, 
Archer and Wolfe agreed to give Colman a 
one and one-half (IV2) year option, instead 
of the original one-year option, for an in-
creased total purchase price of $650,000, 
and the documents reflect this change. 
The Option states that it was given to 
Colman "in consideration of the sum of 
Five Thousand Dollars ($5000.00) and other 
good and valuable consideration, the re-
ceipt of which is hereby acknowledged." 
Allen testified that the recital of "$5000.00 
and other good and valuable consideration 
the receipt of which is hereby acknowl-
edged" was inserted by him merely as a 
legal shorthand for the true consideration. 
He claimed the $5000 was never intended 
to be the actual consideration for the Op-
tion and that is why the recital indicated 
that $5000 had been paid. Allen claimed 
that the real consideration for the Option 
was the execution of the limited partner-
ship agreement, the Anderson Ranch 
agreement, and the various tax benefits 
accruing to Archer and Wolfe by the struc-
turing of the deal. 
Colman did not pay $5000 to Archer and 
Wolfe for the Option. Archer and Wolfe 
made various verbal inquiries regarding 
payment, to which Colman responded he 
did not believe he had to pay the $5000 
based on the advice of Allen. 
On November 2, 1982, Colman executed 
a Real Estate Contract which assigned his 
rights under the Option to Miller as Col-
man could not secure the $650,000 neces-
sary to exercise the Option. Subsequently, 
Archer and Wolfe received written notice 
of this assignment and contacted Miller to 
inform him that the $5000 for the Option 
had never been paid by Colman. In addi-
tion, despite the lack of payment, Archer 
stated that he and Wolfe were still willing 
to sell the Anderson Ranch to Miller ^ pr, a 
purchase price of $655,000. Negotiations 
for this sale occurred, but it was never 
consummated. *
 rf» 
MILLER 
Cite as 749 PJd 1 
On April 8, 1983, Archer and Wolfe at-
tempted to revoke the Option. Subse-
quently, Miller, Colman and Allen met and 
discussed the status of the Option and all 
agreed that the $5000 was never intended 
to be paid, but merely functioned as win-
dow-dressing. The true consideration con-
sisted of the structuring of the transaction. 
Allen and Colman executed affidavits to 
this effect following this meeting. 
On May 16, 1983, Miller filed this action 
against Archer and Wolfe and a lis pendens 
against the Anderson Ranch. Archer and 
Wolfe later filed a third-party complaint 
against Colman. On July 1, 1983, Miller 
tendered to Archer and Wolfe his cashier's 
check for $650,000 as an exercise of the 
Option to purchase the Anderson Ranch. 
The check was deposited in an interest-
bearing account, with entitlement to such 
interest to be determined by the court. 
Since Miller's July 1, 1983 tender, Archer 
and Wolfe have held possession and all 
rights of ownership to the Anderson 
Ranch. 
CONSIDERATION FOR OPTION 
The primary issue on appeal is whether 
the trial court correctly ruled that the at-
tempted revocation of the Option was inef-
fective. The trial court found there was 
adequate consideration to support the Op-
tion and therefore Miller was entitled to 
specific performance. Over Archer's and 
Wolfe's objections, the trial court admitted 
parol evidence to ascertain the intended 
consideration for the Option. On appeal, 
Archer and Wolfe contend the considera-
tion can be gleaned from the plain lan-
guage of the Option and, therefore, the 
trial court erred in admitting such evi-
dence.1 We disagree. 
11-3] Even if a written agreement ap-
pears to be completely integrated, parol 
evidence is admissible to establish whether 
there was consideration for a promise. 
Soukop v. Snyder, 709 P.2d 109, 113 (Ha-
1. The contentions of Archer and Wolfe are in-
consistent They argue the consideration can 
be gleaned from the plain language of the Op-
tion. However, while making this argument, 
they seem to ignore the plain language of the 
v. ARCHER Utah 1277 
274 (UlahApp. 19K8) 
waii CtApp.1985) (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 218(2) (1981)). A 
recital of consideration received is usually 
intended merely as written acknowledg-
ment of the distinct act of payment It is 
inserted for convenience, usually because 
the parties do not want to reveal the real 
consideration. Paloni v. Beebe, 100 Utah 
115, 118, 110 P.2d 563, 565 (1941) (quoting 
9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2433 (3rd ed. 1981). 
Therefore, the parol evidence rule does not 
prevent a party from showing the actual 
consideration when a nominal consideration 
is recited. Wood v. Roberts, 586 P.2d 405, 
407 (Utah 1978). 
[4] There is substantial evidence to sup-
port the trial court's conclusion that the 
recital of "$5000.00 and other good and 
valuable consideration, the receipt of which 
is hereby acknowledged" in the Option was 
nominal consideration inserted by the draft-
er of the agreement for convenience as the 
parties did not wish to reveal in writing the 
true consideration for the deal. 
At trial, there was conflicting testimony 
on the necessity of paying the $5000 to 
Archer and Wolfe. Colman claimed he 
knew that the $5000 was required to be 
paid before he could exercise the Option. 
However, Colman's testimony was contra-
dicted by his own admissions on cross-ex-
amination, his deposition prior to trial, his 
affidavit of May 2, 1983, and his contempo-
raneous handwritten notes. Allen testified 
that he had consistently informed the par-
ties that he had inserted the $5000 amount 
on his own, intending it as a legal short-
hand for the true consideration, and it was 
not an item for which the parties bar-
gained. 
The trial court found Allen's testimony 
more credible and consistent than Col-
man's, finding that the $5000 was never 
intended to be paid. "[D]ue regard shall be 
given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of witnesses." 
Adams v. Gubler, 731 P.2d 494, 496 n. 3 
Option which states that the receipt of the con-
sideration is hereby acknowledged. We will not 
view the language of the Option out of context 
as urged by Archer and Wolfe. 
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(Utah 1986) (quoting Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a)). 
There is substantial evidence to support th^ 
determination of the trial court, and, thu$f 
that finding must be sustained. Saiher t>% 
Pitcher, 73 Utah Adv.Rep. 85, 86, 748 P.2<J 
191 (Utah CtApp.1987). 
[5] The trial court found the true cor\, 
sideration for the Option was embodied i^ 
the phrase "other good and valuable cor*, 
sideration." Because of its ambiguity, th^ 
trial court considered parol evidence to di$. 
close its true meaning. "[W]hen a contract 
is ambiguous, because of the uncertain 
meaning of terms, missing terms, or othe*» 
facial deficiencies, parol evidence is admi%. 
sible to explain the parties' intent*' 
Faulkner v. Famsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 
1293 (Utah 1983); Colonial Leasing Co. v% 
Larsen Bros. Const, 731 P.2d 483, 487 
(Utah 1986). In such a determination, w^ 
defer to the finder of fact Craig Fooq 
Indus., Inc. v. Weihing, 746 P.2d 279, 28$ 
(Utah Ct.App.1987); Faulkner v. Farns. 
worth, 665 P.2d at 1293; Winegar t\ 
Smith Inv. Co., 590 P.2d 348, 350 (Utal* 
1979). 
[6] The trial court considered the testiL 
mony of the parties and found that thi^ 
phrase referred to the execution of th^ 
various documents conveying the Anderson 
Ranch and limited partnership interests^ 
and the general tax structuring of the tota) 
transaction. The trial court looked at th^ 
substance of the parties' entire dealings 
and found that the structuring of the total 
commitments was the intended considereu 
tion for the Option. We cannot say thi^ 
was error. Sather v. Pitcher, 73 Utal\ 
Adv.Rep. at 86, 748 P.2d 191. 
[7] Archer and Wolfe also contend that 
the one and one-half (1%) year option was a 
new agreement, executed after the original 
one-year option, and therefore required 
new consideration. We disagree. The 
facts support the trial court's finding that 
the original one-year option was never fi-
nalized. The original consideration sup-
ported the one and one-half (Vk) year op-
tion. 
[8] The trial court's finding that there 
was sufficient consideration to support the 
Option does not invalidate any of the other 
agreements, as Archer and Wolfe claim. 
The Option, limited partnership agreement, 
purchase contract and special warranty 
deed are in no way impaired and are still 
valid and enforceable agreements within 
the context of the larger transaction, as the 
parties intended. The trial court merely 
found the execution of these other agree-
ments was the intended consideration for 
the Option. 
COLMAN'S HANDWRITTEN NOTES 
[9] Archer and Wolfe claim the trial 
court committed reversible error in admit-
ting copies of Colman'8 handwritten notes; 
made during the course of the negotiations 
between him and Archer and Wolfe. The 
notes conflicted with Colman's trial testi-
mony. The trial court found that, although 
the notes' were not totally legible,' partially 
cut off by the copier, and stapled together 
by Miller's attorneys, they did provide a 
certain narrative flow and consistency that 
gave them substantial credibility. These 
notes were properly admitted for impeach-
ment purpdses. Schocker v. Milton 0. Bit-
ner Co., 30 Utah 2d 173, 176, 514 P.2d 
1290, 1292 (1973); Utah R.Evid. 
801(dXlXA). Furthermore, the admission 
of the notes was duplicative of other com-
petent evidence that impeached Colman's 
trial testimony, including Colman's prior 
deposition and affidavit 
INTEREST 
[101 Archer and Wolfe also challenge 
the award of accrued interest to Miller. 
The trial court concluded that Miller was 
entitled to the accruing interest on the 
$650,000 deposited with the clerk of tKe 
court after Archer and Wolfe refused the 
tender by Miller and retained possession of 
Anderson Ranch. 
t i l ] Common law and equity require 
that if a party obligated to sell land retains 
possession, forcing the buyer to plac# 
funds on deposit with the court pending 
settlement of the action, then the selleFis* 
not entitled to the accrued interest on \f& 
deposited funds. Rasmussen v. Moe, 188 
STATE v. 
Ct(ea«749 PJA UTS 
CaLApp.2d 499, 292 P.2d 226, 230 (2 Dist 
1956); Resnick v. Goldman, 133 So.2d 770, 
771-772 (Fla.1961). The trial court's find-
ing that Archer and Wolfe had enjoyed 
possession and all rights of ownership of 
the Anderson Ranch since Miller's July 1, 
1983 tender of the $650,000 necessary to 
exercise the Option was supported by sub-
stantial evidence. Archer and Wolfe re-
tained all rents and profits paid for grazing 
use of the land by third parties. In con-
trast, Miller received no commercial benefit 
from the Anderson Ranch. What limited 
and sporadic recreational use Miller has 
had of the ranch has been without objection 
by Archer and Wolfe, and similar to that 
traditionally enjoyed by many others in the 
area. 
Affirmed. Costs to Miller. 
DAVIDSON and GARFF, JJ.f concur. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
ERNEST J. MILLER, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT 
JOHN D. ARCHER and ELIZABETH ) AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
B. ARCHER, both individually and ) 
as Trustees for the Elizabeth ) 
Daly Archer Trust, and HUBERT ) 
WOLFE, JUDY W. WOLFE, and ELLIOTT ) 
WOLFE, as Trustees for Elliott ) 
Wolfe Trust No. 701, ) 
Defendants. ) 
JOHN D. ARCHER and ELIZABETH ) |B. ARCHER, both individually and ) 
las Trustees for the Elizabeth ) 
Daly Archer Trust, and HUBERT ) 
WOLFE, JUDY W. WOLFE, and ELLIOTT ) 
WOLFE, as Trustees for Elliott ) Civil No. 21692 
Wolfe Trust No. 701, ) 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, ) 
! vs. ) 
1 V 
WILLIAM J. COLMAN, ) 
, Third-Party Defendant. ) 
Number 
A t IO 1 (1 n n C 
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THIS MATTER having come on for trial before the above-
[entitled Court, the Honorable Omer J. Call District Judge, 
presiding and sitting without a jury- on September 18, 19, 20. 27, 
(October 3, November 14, and December 17, 1985- and Plaintiff 
paving been represented by its counsel of record, L. Brent Hoggan, 
{of Olson & Hoggan, and the Defendants having been represented by 
their counsel of record, E. Craig Smay. and the Third-Party 
Defendant, knowingly, voluntarily and after discussing the same 
|with the Court, having been represented by himself- and the Court 
[having heard testimony from witnesses for -a 11 the parties hereto, 
and having received and accepted certain exhibits offered by the 
parties as evidence in the matter* and the Court having received 
trial briefs from counsel for both Plaintiff and the Defendants on 
[the primary issues before the Court- and the Court having made and 
jentered its written Memorandum Decision herein, and having 
[reviewed and considered Plaintiff's proposed Findings, Conclusions 
and Judgment and Defendants1 Objections thereo* and being fully 
advised in the premises, THE COURT DOES NOW MAKE AND ENTER THE 
FOLLOWING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The real property which is the subject of this action by 
Plaintiff for specific performance of a purchase option relating 
to said property is a composite of several semi-contiguous parcels 
of undeveloped land and appurtenant water rights located Southeast 
jof Paradise. Utah, comprising in the whole 1840.14 acres, more or 
jless, primarily used for cattle grazing and recreation, and 
generally known and referred to hereinafter as the "Anderson 
JRanch'1, which property is located totally within the boundaries of 
Cache County. Utah, and more particularLy described as follows 
Parcel I: The Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter-
the South half of the Northeast quarter - the Southeast 
quarter of the Northwest quarter- the East half of the 
Southeast quarter* the Northwest quarter of the Southwest 
-3-
quarter of Section 26- the North half of the 
Northwest quarter- the Southwest quarter of the Southeast 
quarter of Section 25- the Northeast quarter of the 
Northeast quarter; the Northeast quarter of the Southeast 
quarter- the Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter: the 
South half of the Southwest quarter of Section 24- the 
Southeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section 23* in 
Township 10 North, Range 3 East. Salt Lake Base and Meridian-
Lots 2, 3 and 4- the Southeast quarter of the Southwest 
quarter* the Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter- and 
the Northeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section 19 
Township 10 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
Parcel 2: The West half of the Southeast quarter and the 
East half of the Southwest quarter of Section 26. Township 10 
North. Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Parcel 3- The Northeast 
tKe" Northwest quarter; th 
quarter- the Northwest qu 
Section 19, the East half 
North half of the Southea 
Township 10 North, Range 
Meridian. Also the South 
Southwest quarter of the 
Township 10 North, Range 
Meridian. 
quarter 
e North 
arter o 
of the 
• the 
east 
f the 
Nort 
st quarter o 
4 East 
west qu 
of th 
arter 
Northwest qu 
3 East, Salt 
Southeast quarter of 
quarter of the Southwest 
Southeast quarter of 
heast quarter; and the 
f Section 30, in 
e Salt Lake Base and 
of Section 25, and the 
arter of Section 26, 
Lake Base and 
Parcel 4: The West half of the Northeast quarter; the 
Northeast quarter of the Northwest quarter* and the Southeast 
quarter of the Southwest quarter; of Section 30, Township 10 
North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Together with all water rights /appxxrrt /at>mrrt^ tnmit to the above-
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described property. (/ 
2. The Plaintiff herein, Ernest Junior Miller (hereinafter 
"MilLer"), is a resident of Cache County, Utah. The Defendants 
named herein, both as individuals and as trustees, John D. Archer 
(hereinafter "Archer"), Elizabeth B. Archer, Elliott Wolfe 
(hereinafter "Wolfe"), Hubert Wolfe and Judy W. Wolfe, are all 
residents of Salt Lake County, Utah. The Third-Party Defendant 
herein, William J. Colman (hereinafter "Colman"), is also a 
II 
OC:Ck 
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resident of Salt Lake County, Utah. Miller, Colman, Archer 
and Wolfe are men of considerable business experience and acumen, 
particuarly in matters of cattle raising and beef fabrication 
(Miller), mining, oil and gas (Colman and Archer) and real estate 
(Archer, Wolfe and Colman). ^Af^chtrc and 'Wolfe arc men of <^\ 
een^irfe^abXo f inanri^H^ljB?raTTC^. 
3. Colman is a shareholder and President of Royalty 
Investment Corporation, also known as Royalty Investment Company 
(hereinafter "Royalty11) , a Utah corporation. Most, if not all, of 
the balan9e<r-of Jkoyal^y* ^ stock, i^ owned by Colman's relatives: and 
the company is. within Colman s effective control. Colman acquire 
the Anderson Ranch for Royalty ha^BSST by purchasing E. H. Cameron 
and H. C. Anderson's rights (as Buyers) under a June 1961 Contract 
of Sale with LaMar Anderson and Lucille Anderson (as Sellers). 
4. In the late Summer or early Fall of 1981, Colman ap-
proached Defendant Archer for a loan of $750,000.00, money which 
Colman urgently needed to continue development of the Carson Sink 
salt project (certain mineral rights and evaporation ponds used 
for commercial salt production located in Nevada). Said mineral 
project was owned by Owanah Oil Corporation, of which Colman was 
President, and was in serious financial trouble due, at least in 
i . . . . . . 
i p a r t . t o e x c e s s i v e p r e c i p i t a t i o n in t h e p a s t . 
] 5 . S u b s e q u e n t l y , Archer adv i sed Colman t h a t Archer and 
J1 Wolfe , wi th whom Archer had d i s c u s s e d Colman 's o f f e r , were n o t 
i n t e r e s t e d in a s imp le loan and were not i n t e r e s t e d in i n v e s t i n g 
•Ac clMcu/jT ^G-fug-treid CL4V6A/£< 
sgg^B&tgm $600 ?QQQ* Oft in any e v e n t . Colman s u g g e s t e d t h a t £fci± 
ffismaJcier ammmX-y-^ffi could be s ecu red by t h e Anderson 
4 & HOGGAN 
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i Ranch (indicating that Colman. at least, believed the ranch had 
|that much value). The possibility of a limited partnership 
i 
; interest in the Carson Sink salt project was also discussed. 
i 6. Based upon these preliminary discussions. Colman had his 
i long-time attorney, Frank J. Allen, of Salt Lake City. Utah 
(hereinafter "Allen11) , prepare a document (Exhibit 1) by which 
Archer and Wolfe would invest $600,000.00 in a limited partnership 
for the Carson Sink project, which investment Colman would secure 
<ti n 
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with a Trust Deed on the Anderson Ranch. Said document was 
never executed. 
7. Subsequently, and after considering certain tax savings 
possibilities with their accountants, Archer and Wolfe advised 
Colman that they were only interested in advancing Colman 
$500,000.00 total for his salt project, and this on condition that 
the $500,000.00 be structured to appear by record as an investment 
of $250,000.00 in a limited partnership on the salt project, 
providing tax write-offs for research and development expenses, 
and an interest in profits during the life of the partnership and 
an overriding royalty thereafter; and with the other $250,000.00 
to be shown as the purchase price for the Anderson Ranch, coupled 
with a one-year option in Colman to reacquire the Ranch for 
$600,000.00, which would permit Defendants to treat the difference 
as a capital gain. Archer, Wolfe and Colman reached an agreement 
in principle on this arrangement, and Defendants accepted Colman1s 
suggestion that Allen draw up the necessary papers to document the 
deal. 
8. In October and/or November of 1981, Archer, Wolfe and 
Colman met with Allen at the latter1s office on at least two 
separate occasions, first to discuss their agreement and later to 
execute the documents prepared by Mr. Allen pursuant to their 
instructions. AlLen was advised by Archer, Wolfe and Colman that, 
although the primary purpose of the arrangement was to get 
$500,000.00 to Colman for his salt project, they wanted the deal 
structured such that it would appear as three separate 
transactions (i.e., the limited partnership, the purchase of the 
ranch, and the option back on the ranch), aO-ja£--t*rHHg33ze^  
n:^^3B3rr^^i=afc§- and secure Archer and Wolfe all the tax 
advantages they were seeking. The structure of the deal was not 
so critical to Colman as securing the $500,000.00 from the 
Defendants, as long as he had an opportunity to get the Anderson 
Ranch back. The different dates on the various documents were 
largely irrelevant to him. He was in great need of the money and 
0 0 4 < 
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was willing to use the various resources within his control to 
consummate a deal any way he could. 
9. Pursuant to the directions received from Archer, Wolfe 
and Colman, Allen prepared the Certificate and Agreement of 
Limited Partnership of Solar Chemical Company, for Archer and 
Wolfe's $250,000.00 contribution to the salt project (Exhibit 3, 
hereinafter the "Limited Partnership Agreement"), the Contract for 
Purchase of Real Property, for the purchase by Defendants of the 
Anderson Ranch for $250,000.00 (Exhibit 4, hereinafter the 
"Contract"), the Special Warranty Deed from Royalty to the 
Defendants (Exhibit 5), and an option from Defendants to Colman to 
permit him to repurchase the Anderson Ranch for $600,000.00. 
Subsequently, the parties agreed to give Colman an option on the 
Anderson Ranch for 1-1/2 years for a purchase price of $650,000.00 
(Exhibit 8, hereinafter the "Option"). The original one (l)-year 
option for $600,000.00 was never executed by the parties. 
10. The Limited Partnership Agreement establishing Solar 
Chemical Company was dated October 15, 1981, as was Archer's 
initial check to Owanah Oil Corporation, the General Partner in 
Solar Chemical Company, for $50,000.00 (Exhibit 23). Colman was a 
shareholder and President of Owanah, which company apparently was 
within his effective control. 
11. The Limited Partnership Agreement provided for periodic 
contributions by the Limited Partners. Archer and Wolfe, totaLling 
$250,000.00, and states that Archer and Wolfe were each to receive 
a five percent (5%) share in Solar Chemical's net profits over 
three (3) years and that each would receive a one-half of one 
percent (#8#5%) overriding royalty thereafter on all sodium saLts 
recovered from the project. 
12. The Contract between Royalty (signed by Colman, as 
President), as Seller, and Archer, Archer's wife and Wolfe, as the 
sole named Trustee of ElLiott Wolfe Trust 701 (hereinafter the 
"Wolfe Trust"), as Purchasers, was an executory contract for the 
sale of the Anderson Ranch to the Defendants, specifying January 
4, 1982 as the closing date. It was dated November 9, 1981, 
as was Wolfe's check to Rov^ lt-v f^ * > AA ^ '*- • •• 
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13. The Special Warranty Deed conveying the Anderson Ranch 
from Royalty (again signed by Colman, as President), to the 
Defendants was dated January 4, 1982 (Exhibit 5). Said Special 
Warranty Deed, as well as the Contract and the Option, all contain 
a scrivinor's error in the legal description of the Anderson 
Ranch, mistakenly and unintentionally referencing Township 10 
South, instead of Township 10 North, in Parcel 3 thereof. No 
evidence was received (or offered) suggesting that Colman acted 
without authority in executing the Contract, the Special Warran 
Deed or subsequent deeds as President of Royalty Investment 
Corporation. The documents^ ffffftFaa: A tfalid'a 
£ 
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14. The Option from the Defendants to Colman was dated March 
of 1982 (viz, "this day of March, 1982"). The purpose of 
said Option was to allow Colman the right to reacquire the Ander-
son Ranch on or before July 2, 1983 for $650,000.00. It was 
executed by Archer, Mrs. Archer and Wolfe in their individual and 
respective trustee capacities. T&eir execution of Hie Qpllotf- ^ * 
coxi^ e^ pnTKhs—pr~et:isely with how they rook cirle to tne Anderson 
15. All of the aforereferenced documents, Exhibits 3, 4, 5 
and 8, were prepared at or about the same time by Frank Allen, 
pursuant to the instructions of the parties, as part of a unified, 
integrated transaction. They were all executed by the parties on 
the same date, most likely on or about November 9, 1981, as 
indicated on the back of said check. 
16. Although Colman was in debt and had an acute need for 
funds to continue his salt project, Archers' check to Owanah Oil 
in the amount of $50,000.00, dated October 15, 1981 (Exhibit 23), 
was not cashed by Colman until on or about November 10, 1981, as 
indicated on the back of said check. 
17. Colman and his attorney, Allen, required a simultaneous 
execution of the documents, particularly the Contract, the 
original. Special Warranty Deed and the Option, in order to assure 
that Colman was protected as to his right to reacquire the 
Anderson Ranch, even though the dates were spaced out for 
Defendants1 tax purposes. The Court finds it probable that 
Archer, likewise, was unwilling to part with his first check for 
$50,000.00 prior to securing the DofonH^nt-o« «~,,-.•#--•-- ..---i 
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Limited Partnership Agreement, Contract and Option be executed 
at the same time so that Colman would not be deeding away the 
Anderson Ranch without a right to repurchase the same- Such an 
entitlement was always part of the parties' agreement and 
essential to Colman1s willingness to enter into the related 
transactions. Colman was promised that right to repurchase the 
Ranch as part of the total deal and relied on that promise in 
executing the deed conveying the Ranch to Defendants. 
18. Elliott Wolfe represented to Colman and Allen that he 
had authority to sign any agreement for his trust and intended 
that his signature bind the trust and that Colman and Allen rely 
thereon; and Colman and Allen did rely upon his representation and 
signature. Mrs. Archer's signature was secured the same day that 
the other parties signed the Option, or the very next day. The 
Option was then delivered by Archer, either that same day or the 
next day, to Colman. 
19. Allen never received a copy of the Wolfe Trust agreement 
from Wolfe (nor was it produced at trial): nor did the other 
ostensible trustees to the Wolfe Trust, Hubert Wolfe and Judy 
Wolfe, ever notify Colman, Allen or Miller that they objected to 
Wolfe's binding the Trust by his signature alone- nor did Wolfe 
seriously claim that he lacked authority to bind the Wolfe Trust. 
20. The Option reads that it was given to Colman "in 
consideration of the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) and 
other good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby 
acknowledged". This recital of $3,000.00 and the "other good and 
valuable consideration" came from Allen, who had also inserted the 
same figure in the original, one-year, $600,000.00 option to 
Colman, which was never executed. The fictitious $5,000.00 
consideration was carried over to the Option (Exhibit 8), which 
reflects the parties' agreement to give Colman an option for 1-1/2 
years for an additional $50,000.00 (total: $650,000.00), which 
Option was executed. 
21. Said $5,000.00 was never intended by the parties to be 
paid. It was merely window-dressing which Allen pulled out of the 
air and inserted to give credence to th& H^^..—-*- -~ 
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Defendants acknowledged receipt of the same, even though they 
had not actually received $5,000.00, because they all knew it was 
not to be paid. The real consideration for the Option consisted 
of the flother good and valuable consideration", which included the 
conveyance of the Anderson Ranch by Special Warranty Deed from 
Royalty to the Defendants, the $650,000.00 to be paid for the 
Anderson Ranch upon exercise of the Option, the Limited 
Partnership benefits as to profit sharing and the overriding 
royalty, and the various tax benefits accruing to the Defendants 
by structuring the total transaction their way. The Court finds 
that it was never the intent of the parties at the time the Option 
was granted that $5,000.00 was the consideration for the Option, 
or that the $5,000.00 would, in fact, ever be paid. 
22. The Court notes that the Option on its face and by its 
terms gives the Defendants no right of revocation. There are no 
restrictions on its face as to its assignability by Colman to 
third parties, nor is there any language suggesting the Option was 
strictly personal to Colman. 
23. Within a week after November 15, 1981, the date of a 
title commitment from Northern Title Company (Exhibit 64), said 
report was mailed to Colman or Allen by said title company. This 
title report, among other things, disclosed an error in the legal 
description of the Anderson Ranch, as set forth in paragraph 13 of 
these Findings. Two Special Warranty Deeds (Exhibits 6 and 7) 
were subsequently prepared for the purpose of conveying the 
Anderson Ranch from Royalty to the Defendants with the necessary 
correction to the legal description (i.e., changing "Township 10 
South" to "Township 10 North" for Parcel 3). They were dated 
January 4, 1982, and recorded by Allen on January 7, 1982. The 
new Special Warranty Deed for the Wolfe interest (Exhibit 7) in 
the Anderson Ranch was conveyed to "Elliott Wolfe, Trustee of the 
Elliott Wolfe Trust No. 701", and so recorded, without any 
reference to co-trustees. 
24. On January 22, 1982, a Correction of Correction Deed 
(Exhibit 45) was executed by Lucille Anderson to Royalty, and 
thereafter recorded to correct the error contained in the 
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legal description of the 1980 deed from her and her husband to 
Royalty for the Anderson Ranch. 
25. Colman never paid $5,000.00 to the Defendants for the 
Option. Neither Archer nor Wolfe ever made any written request to 
Colman to pay the $5,000.00. When Archer made his first verbal 
inquiry regarding payment of the $5,000.00, which may have been 
sometime in March, 1982, Colman told him that he did not believe 
he had to pay the $5,000.00. When Colman contacted Allen, Allen 
reaffirmed for him that the $5,000.00 was never intended to be 
paid and advised Colman against paying it, inasmuch as the 
consideration supporting the total deal was comprised of those 
considerations set forth hereinabove at Finding 22. Allen 
consistently advised Colman, Archer, Wolfe and Plaintiff that the 
parties to the Option never intended for Colman to pay the 
$5,000.00. Colman never conceded that he owed the $5,000.00. 
26. The Defendants1 later assertions that Colman1s 
non-payment of the $5,000.00 rendered the Option invalid and 
unenforceable lacks credibility , This Court finds that 
Defendants argument isAmef&±$~-i!^^ 
th^j^H^A^n ftp qjUhompt- f-**=r4-*w^ L i A a f n f-hn ftpf°rrfh I t was n e v e r 
agreed or intended that Colman was to pay $5,000.00 to the 
Defendants. The number recited was fictitious, which is why the 
Defendants signed the Option acknowledging their receipt of that 
sum, as well as their receipt of the Mother good and valuable 
consideration", which phrase circumscribed the true consideration 
for the Option. The Defendants1 testimony as to their purported 
negotiations, renegotiations and the calculations which they 
allege resulted in the $5,000.00 consideration for the Option is 
contradicted not only by Allen's testimony and Colman1s Affidavit, 
but by Defendant's own pleadings (viz., paragraph 4 of their 
Third-Party Complaint). 
85*6 
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27. The Defendants represented to Colman and his attorney 
that Colman would have a right to reacquire the Anderson Ranch. 
Defendants intended that Colman and his attorney should rely on 
those representations and upon the sufficiency of the Option, as 
executed. Colman and his attorney did rely on those 
representations and on the Option as executed. In light of 
Defendants1 subsequent repudiation of the Option, that reliance 
was to Colman1s detriment. 
28. Archer and Wolfe never visited the Anderson Ranch or the 
Carson Sink salt project until the Spring of 1982. They never 
checked the title to the Carson Sink properties, nor did they ever 
verify the water rights appurtenant to the Anderson Ranch, until 
the Spring of 1982. The Defendants never secured title insurance 
on the Anderson Ranch. 
29. The overriding royalty rights in the Carson Sink which 
the Limited Partnership Agreement states will be assigned to 
Archer and Wolfe had not been assigned to them or recorded by them 
at the time of trial, four (4) years after the Limited Partnership 
Agreement was executed. No profits have ever been paid out by 
Solar Chemical to Archer or Wolfe. 
30. The price purportedly paid for the Anderson Ranch by 
Defendants to Royalty ($250,000.00), and the price which Colman 
was to pay Defendants to reacquire the Anderson Ranch under the 
Option only eighteen (18) months later ($650,000.00), cannot, as a 
matter of reason, stand alone. The property was professionally 
appraised (See Exhibit 59) for $427,240.00 ten (10) years prior to 
the sale by Colman to the Defendants. Moreover, even if the 
Anderson Ranch was worth only $250,000.00 on January 4, 1982, the 
Court cannot believe that Colman had a reasonable expectation that 
the market value of the Anderson Ranch would be 2607o of its prior 
sales value only 1-1/2 years later (or at any time in between) . 
Although Archer and Wolfe testified the sale of the Anderson Ranch 
was a totally separate transaction and that Colman got the best 
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price he could for the ranch at the time, it was admitted that 
Colman, who had known for several years that Miller was interested 
in acquiring the Anderson Ranch or an interest therein, never 
contacted Miller to see if he would be interested in bidding more 
than $250,000.00 for it. These prices make sense only when viewed 
in the context of the layer, unified transaction. 
31. Although it is not strictly necessary to its decision, 
the Court finds that the $650,000.00 purchase price for Colman1s 
exercise of the Option more truly corresponds to a twenty percent 
(20%) return on a composite $500,000.00 secured investment by 
Defendants in Colman's salt project for one and one-half (1-1/2) 
years. The total transaction was the functional equivalent of a 
secured loan ($500,000.00 loaned by Defendants to Colman for 1-1/2 
years at 20% interest, secured by the Anderson Ranch in case he 
failed to repay them), dressed up so as to give Archer and Wolfe 
certain additional incentives and to secure the Defendants various 
tax advantages (e.g., the tax write-off for their investment in 
Solar Chemical was worth a minimum to Archer and Wolfe of 
$60,000.00 -- See Exhibit 11). 
32. The Court finds much credibility in the testimony of 
Allen. His recollections under oath are entitled to great weight. 
He was the only witness to the original negotiations and the 
preparation and execution of the central documents who was not a 
party to the same. He has no interest in the Anderson Ranch or 
the outcome of this litigation. Judging by his own testimony, and 
that of the Plaintiff, John Clay and John Miller, and Allen's own 
April 29, 1983 Affidavit (Exhibit 27), his statements have been 
consistent from the beginning with respect to the true nature of 
the parties1 integrated transaction and the Option, in particular. 
If Allen's testimony were to be biased, one would reasonably 
expect that bias to favor his client: but instead, Allen 
contradicted Colman's recollections at trial on several critical 
facts. 
85)8 
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33. By contrast, the testimony of Bill Colman at trial, when 
measured against his admissions on cross-examination, and the 
contradictions contained in his prior deposition, his Affidavit of 
May 2, 1983 (Exhibit 28), and his handwritten notes (Exhibits 54, 
55 and 56), convince the Court that his testimony at trial is 
entitled to very little weight or credibility. Although Colman!s 
Affidavit and handwritten notes are not strictly necessary to the 
Court's decision herein, they represent a more reliable index of 
the true history and intention of the parties than his trial 
testimony several years later and also serve to seriously impeach 
his trial testimony. His affidavit was signed under oath at a 
time when the relevant facts were much fresher in his memory than 
at trial, when his recollection of several matters was 
insufficient or non-existent. When Plaintiff's counsel presented 
him with Exhibits 54, 55 and 56, Colman expressed considerable 
surprise, alarm and anger, but admitted subsequently that they 
were copies of his own handwritten notes which he then read for 
the Court. Although the notes are not totally legible, are 
partially cut off by the copier (particularly Exhibit 54), and 
were stapled together by Plaintifffs attorneys, they are for the 
most part dated, reference Defendants Archer and Wolfe and have a 
certain narrative flow and consistency that gives them substantial 
credibility. Any undue surprise to Defendants was overcome by the 
several days interval they had to inspect the Exhibits after their 
introduction and before Colmanfs testimony on the same. The 
demeanor of all the witnesses was significant to the Court during 
this trial. 
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34. In the late Spring or early Summer of 1982, Miller 
learned from Archer and Wolfe that they had obtained an interest 
in the Anderson Ranch. Subsequently, either in August or 
J September of 1982, Miller discussed the status of the Anderson 
I Ranch with Colman, who represented to Miller that Archer and 
j Wolfe's interest in the Anderson Ranch was in the nature of a 
security interest. At the same time, Colman indicated a desire to 
J sell his rights in the Anderson Ranch to Miller. 
| 35. Plaintiff's attorney, William L. Fillmore, of Logan, 
I Utah, (hereinafter "Fillmore"), thereafter communicated with both 
|i Colman and Allen and received from them copies of the documents 
I covering the prior integrated transaction between Colman and the 
j Defendants, including receipt from Colman of the Option with 
(original signatures of John Archer, Elizabeth Archer and Elliott 
jl Wolfe, and an original notarization by Carole Lake. The 
!correspondence between Fillmore, Allen and Colman (Exhibits 68, 
69, 70 and 71) and testimony at trial indicate the preparation of 
a draft Real Estate Contract by Fillmore, Allen and Colman's 
ij review of the same, negotiations (including one meeting at the 
i| Salt Lake Airport between Colman, Miller, Fillmore and John 
(Miller, the Plaintiff's nephew), and the modification of the 
original draft. 
|j 36. On November 2, 1982, Colman and Allen met Plaintiff, 
J Fillmore and John Miller at the Salt Lake Airport to review and 
(execute the revised Real Estate Contract (Exhibit 9, hereinafter 
the "Real Estate Contract") between Colman and Miller. After 
Colman and Allen reviewed the same, Colman and Miller then 
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executed the Real Estate Contract, dating the same November 2, 
1982. Pursuant to the contractual obligation contained therein. 
Miller paid the $1,000.00 consideration to Colman in December, 
1982. 
37. The Real Estate Contract assigned all of Colman1s rights 
under the Option to Miller, granting Miller an independent right 
to exercise the Option and acquire 100% of the Anderson Ranch on 
or before June 18, 1982. 
38. Colman knowingly, voluntarily and with advice of counsel 
warranted in the Real Estate Contract to Miller that ,fthe Option 
is valid and enforcable and, further, that it is freely assignable 
in its entirety without the consent or approval of any third 
party." 
39. As part of the Real Estate Contract, Miller gave Colman 
a new and independent option to reacquire from Miller (if Miller 
exercised the Option) , on or before July 2, 1983, all of the 
Anderson Ranch by paying Plaintiff $650,000.00 on or before that 
date (See Exhibit 9, para. 4.a.), and a second option to 
reacquire, after July 2, 1983 and on or before July 2, 1984, up to 
a 507o interest in the Anderson Ranch by paying his prorated share 
of the purchase price, plus interest, taxes and improvements (See 
para. 4.b.). Plaintiff and Colman agreed that the Real Estate 
Contract was not assignable by either party without the other 
party's prior written consent (See paras. 4.e. and f.). 
40. Also as part of the Real Estate Contract, the parties 
granted each other a mutual and reciprocal right of first refusal 
with respect to either party's subsequent proposed sale of any of 
their rights or interests in the Anderson Ranch, and specified a 
thirty (30) day period in which to exercise the same after receipt 
of written notice from the selling party, accompanied by a copy of 
the duly executed contract of sale (See para. 5). 
-16-
41. At the November 2, 1982 meeting in Salt Lake City, Utah.! 
whereat the Real Estate Contract was executed, it was observed 
that Carole Lake, who had notarized the Option, had failed to fill 
in the blank ("March , 198211) in the notary's paragraph of the 
\ original Opt ion• Colman volunteered to have her correct this and 
I referred to the omission as a simple oversight. Subsequently, Ms. 
Lake did fill in the blank with the number "1" and the Option was 
returned to Fillmore by Colman for recording with the Real Estate i 
Contract, which recordings were effected in Cache County on 
December 20, 1982. 
I 42. After Archer and Wolfe received written notice from 
Miller's attorney, Fillmore, of Colman's assignment of his Option i 
[rights to Plaintiff, Archer called Fillmore on or about January 4, 
j 1983 and told Fillmore, among other things, that the $5,000.00 for 
the Option had never been paid by Colman. Nonetheless, Archer 
indicated that Defendants were still willing to sell the Anderson 
Ranch to Plaintiff if he would pay $655,000.00. 
j 43. During January and February of 1983, Archer, Wolfe and 
Fillmore engaged in negotiations for Miller's purchase of the i 
i Anderson Ranch: but the sale was never consummated because the 
[parties could not agree upon terms, and because Miller was seeking 
j a guaranty from Colman that he would not exercise his rights 
under paragraph 4.a. in order to ensure that Miller would not I 
i incur substantial financing costs in vain. j 
44. On April 8, 1983, the Defendants attempted to revoke the I 
Option by a letter to Colman from the Defendants' prior attorney, j 
Gregory P. Williams (Exhibit 15), wherein said attorney advised, j 
based upon his clients' position that "no consideration was given j 
for the Option", that "the offer has been withdrawn". I 
45. On April 15, 1983, Colman, Allen, Plaintiff, Fillmore, j 
John Miller and John Clay (an employee and financial adviser of j 
Plaintiff) met at Allen's office to confirm what Allen and Colman J 
i 
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had represented previously as to the history and intent behind the 
Option given Colman by the Defendants, in light of Archer and 
Wolfe's position on the $5,000.00 and what appeared to be a 
probability of litigation over the same. Colman and Allen 
reaffirmed at that meeting to Plaintiff and his attorney and 
employees that the $5,000.00 was never intended to be paid, but 
was a number pulled out of the air by Allen as he prepared the 
documents; that Wolfe represented that he had full authority to 
sign the Option for his trust: and that the series of documented 
transactions (the Limited Partnership, the Contract, the Special 
Warranty Deed(s) and the Option), were all part of one, unified, 
integrated scheme which was basically intended to get $500,000.00 
to Colman for his salt project, secure the repayment of the same 
with the Anderson Ranch and guaranty Colman the right to reacquire 
the ranch upon his payback of the $500,000.00 plus a $150,000.00 
premium on the same, structured in a way to give Defendants 
additional incentives and secure certain tax benefits important to 
them -- all of which comprised the true consideration for the 
deal. Allen and Colman agreed to give Plaintiff their Affidavits 
to this effect. 
46. At the April 15, 1983 meeting in Salt Lake City, Colman 
also indicated his willingness, after consulting further with 
Allen, to sign a Waiver and Release similar to the one previously 
requested by Plaintiff in February, 1983 (See Exhibit 34), because 
Colman was in no position to purchase the Anderson Ranch before 
July 2, 1983 and wanted Miller to buy it so that he (Colman) could 
at least have a shot at acquiring a partial interest on or before 
July 2, 1984. 
47. On April 19, 1983, Colman signed a Waiver and Release 
for Miller's benefit, which Waiver and Release was subsequently 
recorded in Cache County on April 20, 1983 (Exhibit 10, 
hereinafter the "Waiver and Release11) . The intent of Colman and 
Miller with the Waiver and Release was to give Miller the 
unqualified right, without any fear that Colman would attempt to 
903 
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reacquire 100% of the Ranch, to exercise the Option and 
acquire the Anderson Ranch on or before July 2, 1983, thereby (a) 
guarantying Plaintiff, by Colman1s waiver of his paragraph 4.a. 
option rights, that Plaintiff, at the very least, would be the 
owner of 507o of the Anderson Ranch (even if Colman were to 
exercise his option under paragraph 4.b. subsequently), (b) 
eliminating the June 18, 1983 deadline for Miller's exercise of 
the Option, because Colman was not in a position to exercise his 
rights under the Option or the Real Estate Contract by July 2, 
1983, and he wanted Miller to do so, and (c) assuring Colman that 
he would later be able to exercise his 507o option reserved under 
paragraph 4.b. if he could come up with the money on or before 
July 2, 1984, because Miller's ownership of the ranch would then 
make the paragraph 4.b. option possible. This mutual intent is 
clearly reflected by the language contained in the Waiver and 
Release: (viz., "...which Waiver and Release is executed by the 
undersigned in order to induce said Ernest Junior Miller to 
exercise his rights under the aforesaid Real Estate Contract and 
purchase the subject property on or before July 2, 1983, without 
fear of any claim of right by William J. Colman to repurchase the 
same from Ernest J. Miller, except as to William J. Colman's 
reserved right to purchase up to a 50% interest in the subject 
property after July 2, 1983 and before July 2, 1984."). (Emphasi 
added.) 
48. Colman induced Miller to exercise the Option, making it 
clear that he had until July 2, 1983 to do so. for Colman1s 
benefit as well as Miller's. Because Colman, at that point, had 
to rely on Miller's ability to purchase the ranch, he extended 
Miller's time to exercise the Option until July 2, 1983, and 
reserved only his right to reacquire up to 50% the next year. It 
would have been irrational, given his financial circumstances and 
his dependence on Miller's exercise, for Colman to arbitrarily 
(and against his own best interests) limit the time for Miller to 
exercise the Option. The purpose of the Waiver and Release was 
further corroborated by Colman's subsequent conduct after its 
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execution (i.e., no objection) and by Miller's conduct in 
reliance thereon (i.e., its execution on July 1). The Court also 
notes that the Defendants were not parties to the Waiver and 
Release, nor were they privy to Colman and Miller's intent 
regarding the same. 
49. No consideration is stated on the face of the Waiver and 
Release, but the Court finds from the testimony at trial that it 
was given by Colman in exchange for Miller's assurance that he 
would exercise the Option, guarantying Colman another year to 
acquire a partial interest in the ranch, and as additional 
consideration, for Miller's promise to Colman that he would not 
have to pay interest on any exercise of his paragraph 4.b. option 
and that, in any event, Colman would be entitled to use the 
property for recreational purposes for the rest of his life. 
50. Following a review of two draft affidavits prepared by 
Fillmore, Allen prepared his own Affidavit (Exhibit 27), signed 
and had it notarized on April 29, 1983. Allen spent the better 
part of the morning on May 2, 1983 with Colman, preparing and 
modifying his draft of Colman's Affidavit (Exhibit 28), which was 
reviewed and discussed by them paragraph-by-paragraph, amended by 
them, and then executed by Colman and notarized by Allen's 
secretary, all on the same day. 
51. On April 18, 1983, Plaintiff called Archer and offered 
to pay $650,000.00 to the Defendants for the Anderson Ranch under 
the Option. Archer indicated that he would have to visit with 
Wolfe before responding. On April 20, 1983, Archer called Miller 
back and informed him of the Defendants' rejection of Miller's 
offer of $650,000.00 for the Anderson Ranch, indicating that 
Defendants did not want to sell the property. 
52. In April of 1983, Archer and Wolfe attempted to persuade 
Colman to exercise his option rights under paragraph 4.a. of the 
Real Estate Contract, so that Archer, WoLfe and Colman could sell 
the property to a third party, and cut Plaintiff out (See Exhibits 
2, 56 and 74). They were subsequently advised by Allen, 
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however that the Waiver and Release which Colman had signed 
for Miller*s benefit made such an attempt to prevent Miller from 
acquiring the ranch illegal. 
53. On May 16, 1983, Plaintiff filed this action against the 
Defendants and a Lis Pendens against the Anderson Ranch. On June 
24, 1983, the Defendants filed their Answer. Defendants filed 
their Third-Party Complaint against Colman on June 30, 1983, and 
then filed their Amended Answer and Counterclaim against Plaintiff 
on July 1, 1983. 
54. On or about June 27 or 28, 1983, Fillmore called E. 
Craig Smay, of Salt Lake City, Utah, the Defendants' attorney 
(hereinafter nSmayfl) , to determine the best way to make the formal 
tender of the $650,000.00 to the Defendants under the Option in 
the context of this pending litigation concerning the same 
property, the Option and the same parties. Inasmuch as Archer and 
Wolfe had rejected Miller's prior offer, and had expressly 
repudiated the Option in their Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint, 
all parties and their attorneys understood that Miller's tender of 
a cashier's check would not be accepted by the Defendants. 
Moreover, neither Archer nor Wolfe were in the State at the time. 
Archer admitted on the stand that he would not have accepted 
Plaintiff's tender of $650,000.00 on July 1, 1983 in any event. 
Fillmore and Smay determined that the best way to handle the 
matter would be to tender the $650,000.00 to the Defendants via 
the Court and then deposit the same upon endorsement in a 
Court-supervised, interest-bearing account. 
55. On July 1, 1983, Fillmore met with Smay at the latter's 
office in Salt Lake City and tendered to Smay, as Defendants' 
attorney, Plaintiff's cashier's check to the Defendants for 
$650,000.00 (Exhibit 13), which money had been borrowed by 
Plaintiff, subject to interest charges. At said meeting the 
attorneys modified and signed a Delivery of Check and Motion and a 
stipulated Order (Exhibit 14), with the express understanding that 
the check would be deposited in a Court-supervised, interest- | 
bearing account and that "entitlement to accrued interest shall be i 
determined by the Court". Pursuant thereto, lillmore later QflfZ 
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that same day filed said Delivery of Check and Motion and the 
Order with this Court and deposited the check with the Clerk of 
the Court. 
56. The language contained in Plaintiff's Complaint, and in 
the Delivery of Check and Motion and the stipulated Order, and the 
verbal expressions of Fillmore to Smay on July 1, 1983, substan-
tially conformed with the tender language requirements of 
paragraph 3 of the Option. 
57. The Option was exercised on July 1, 1983 by Plaintiff, 
without any objection or protest being made by Colman to Plaintiff 
either before or since. 
58. The Option was exercised by Plaintiff according to its 
terms - i.e., the Option called for a tender of $650,000.00 on or 
before July 2, 1983, which requirements Plaintiff met precisely. 
The Defendants were in no way prejudiced by the date of 
Plaintiff's execise of the Option, inasmuch as they had already 
granted that much time to the original optionee. Moreover, the 
Defendants had already made it abundantly clear to Plaintiff, by 
virtue of their prior rejections, that they did not intend to 
accept any tender by Plaintiff regardless of when it might be 
made. 
59. Shortly thereafter, at Smay's suggestion, the parties 
through their attorneys entered into a Stipulation to replace the 
original check (Exhibit 13) with a new check (Exhibit 16), so as 
to permit the deposit of the tendered funds, in the absence of the 
Defendants from the State, into an interest-bearing account. 
Pursuant to that Stipulation, $650,000.00 was subsequently 
deposited at First Interstate Bank, Logan Branch. In the Fall of 
1983, the deposited funds were invested in revolving monthly 
Certificates of Deposit at said bank, which arrangement continued 
until the time of trial. 
i 
J 60. On July 2, 1984 Colman, Archer and Wolfe entered into a 
jcertain Agreement (Exhibit 33), whereby Colman, for $5,000.00, "as 
further consideration for this agreement," agreed to convey to 
jArcher and WoLfe a fifty percent (50%) interest in the Anderson 
4 & HOGGAN 
NEYS AT LAW 
EST CENTER 
BOX 525 
UTAH 84321 
)752 1551 
ed on John 
e company^ 5L 
-22-
Ranch which he hoped to procure through an attempted exercise 
of his paragraph 4.b. option under the Real Estate Contract; and 
whereby Archer and Wolfe agreed to permit Plaintiff to withdraw 
$364,000.00 from the Court-supervised savings account, as and for 
Colman1s tender of that sum, to make possible Colman's exercise of 
the 4.b. option, with the express understanding that Colman would 
deed said interest over to Archer and Wolfe upon his receipt of a 
deed from Miller. The Defendants and their attorney had 
previously received copies of the Real Estate Contract by way of 
Plaintiff's prior pleadings and the discovery herein. 
61. On July 2, 1984, a Notice from Colman (Exhibit 31) and a 
Stipulation from the Defendants (Exhibit 32) was serv 
Clay, an officer of E. A. Miller & Sons Packing Co., 
effectively controlled by Plaintiff, advising Plaintiff that A 
Defendants were willing to allow him to withdraw $364,000.00 from 
the Court-supervised account for purposes of Colman1s exercise of 
the 4.b. option, which attempted exercise of the 4.b. option by 
Colman (and Archer and Wolfe) was never accepted by Miller. 
62. Nonetheless, the funds in the Court-supervised account 
were not Colman1s funds, nor were they the Defendants' funds ab-
sent their delivery of a deed to Plaintiff (See the terms of Exhi-
bit 14, paragraph 4), which they had not done. Moreover, if Mil-
ler had accepted such a tender on July 2, and withdrawn the funds, 
the withdrawal would have been subject to an early withdrawal 
penalty under the certificate of deposit (See Exhibit 60). 
63. Prior to Colman1s (and the Defendants') attempted exer-
cise of the 4.b. option, neither Colman nor Defendants had secured 
Plaintiff's prior written approval of any assignment of Colman1s 
rights, as required by paragraph 4.f. of the Real Estate Contract, 
nor was there any prior verbal notice to or approval by Plaintiff. 
In fact, it appears that Defendants structured their deal in a 
deliberate manner to avoid the non-assignability clause. 
64. In connection with Colman's (and the Defendants') 
attempted exercise of the 4.b. option, no recognition was ever 
i 
given to Miller's first right of refusal. The Plaintiff was never1 
# 
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given written (or verbal) notice of the Agreement between 
Defendants and Colman, nor the sale terms thereof which he would 
have to meet, nor was he ever allowed to exercise his first right 
of refusal within thirty (30) days after receiving a copy of what 
should have been a conditional agreement between Colman and the 
Defendants, pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Real Estate Contract. 
Plaintiff did not learn of, or receive a copy of, the Agreement 
between the Defendants and Colman until the discovery of the same 
was compelled at Defendants1 second depositions on September 27, 
1984. The Agreement between Colman and the Defendants 
unconditionally required Colman to convey to Defendants all his 
rights in the Anderson Ranch which he was to acquire pursuant to 
paragraph 4.b. of the Real Estate Contract. 
65. The Court finds no persuasive evidence of any kind 
suggesting collusion or conspiracy between Colman and Plaintiff to 
defraud Defendants of their interests in the Anderson Ranch or 
regarding any damages suffered by Defendants related thereto, as 
alleged in their Amended Answer and Counterclaim. Indeed, 
Defendants introduced little, if any, evidence concerning these 
allegations. if-^ J±SrF"~TyaTr~aay^ cn1 ]n^rTnv=ror conspiracy in Lilts— 
ca.gg^ ==^ bE=3gaaz=3^ ^ Colrn 
Hay^£gt8^ of hia right to a^ quirie at+y^ 
j j f r f e ^ ^ r B ^ ^ f a Q ^ ^ ^ — I r l T i F ^ R e a l ^ E ^ ^ d r L e CunLrauL, an<]j 
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66. The legal description of the Anderson Ranch contained inj 
the Contract, the Option, the Real Estate Contract, the Waiver and 
Release and Plaintiff's Complaint all contain an obvious ! 
scrivenor's error, referencing lfTownship 10 South", instead of the 
correct description, "Township 10 North", under Parcel 3. None o 
the parties herein are under any misconception as to which 
property was intended to be sold, assigned or otherwise referred 
to in these documents and pleadings, nor have Defendants seriously 
claimed any prejudice if the Court reforms the same. 
cvoo 
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67. The Defendants have enjoyed possession and all rights of 
ownership of the Anderson Ranch since Plaintiff's July 1, 1983 
tender of the $650,000.00. The Defendants have executed leases 
with third parties for the use of the Anderson Ranch, most recent-
ly with Boyd Munns, to run cattle on the ranch property. All 
rents paid under such leases have been received by the Defendants. 
68. In contrast to the Defendants, the Plaintiff has 
received no rents or income, nor has he had any other commercial 
benefit, from the Anderson Ranch since his tender of $650,000.00 
on July 1, 1983; nor has he had the use of his money since then. 
What limited and sporadic recreational use Plaintiff has had of 
the ranch has been without objection by the owners and similar to 
that enjoyed historically by many others in the area. 
69. The Defendants could have received the $650,000.00 
lodged in the Court-supervised savings account at any time after 
July 1, 1983 if they would have provided Plaintiff with a proper 
deed, but they have never delivered a deed to Plaintiff entitling 
them to said tender money. 
70. The Court finds no persuasive evidence of any collusion 
or conspiracy between Colman and Miller to defraud the Defendants 
out of their interests in the Anderson Ranch, as alleged by 
Defendants1 in their Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint. 
71. Exhibits 54,55 and 56 are notes made by Colman at or 
about the time of various conversations between Colman, Archer and 
!
 Wolfe and should be admitted as evidence. Exhibit 28 is Colman1s 
| Affidavit made prior to this litigation and is corroborative of 
the Court1s findings on various issues and should be admitted in 
evidence for all purposes. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has in rem jurisdiction over the Anderson 
Ranch; personal jurisdiction over the Plaintiff, all the 
910 
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Defendants and the Third-Party Defendant; and subject matter 
jurisdiction over those matters which have been brought before the 
Court by way of the parties1 pleadings, including without 
limitation all matters affecting title to the Anderson Ranch as 
between the parties named herein. 
2. That the Real Estate Contract is valid and enforceable in 
all respects and that the Option granted by Archer and Wolfe to 
Colman is irrevocable, valid in all respects and is supported by a 
sufficient consideration. 
3. That the Option was fully assignable by Colman, was 
assigned to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff is the owner and holder of 
the Option. The Waiver and Release is a valid and enforceable 
agreement in all respects and extended to July 2, 1983 the time 
within which Miller should exercise the Option. 
4. That Plaintiff made a valid exercise of the Option under 
the circumstances and is entitled to a decree specifically 
enforcing the Option. 
5. Given the uniqueness of the Anderson Ranch property, 
money damages would be inadequate compensation to the Plaintiff 
for Defendants1 repudiation of the Option. 
6. That Plaintiff has paid the purchase price provided in 
the Option by depositing the same with the Clerk of the Court and 
a decree should enter awarding the $650,000.00 so paid by 
Plaintiff to Defendants. 
7. That interest accrued on the $650,000.00 purchase price 
deposited with the Court is the property of Plaintiff and a decree 
should enter awarding Plaintiff all interest accrued on said 
$650,000.00 while in the custody of the Clerk of the Court. 
8. That a decree should enter correcting the scrivenors 
error describing Parcel 3 of the legal description in the Option, 
Real Estate Contract, the Waiver and Release, and Plaintiff's 
Q11 
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Verified Complaint, to Township 10 North rather than Township 
10 South. 
9. Neither the Real Estate Contract or the rights and 
entitlements of Colman thereunder were assignable by Colman to any 
third party without Plaintiff's prior written consent, which 
consent was never sought nor given by Plaintiff. 
10. The first right of refusal granted to Miller by Colman 
under paragraph 5 of the Real Estate Contract was a valid, legal 
right vested in Miller and enforceable by him against Colman and 
any third party. 
11. The Waiver and Release was a valid and enforceable 
agreement between Colman and Plaintiff, was supported by adequate 
consideration and was intended to and did enable Plaintiff to 
lawfully exercise the Option to purchase the Anderson Ranch on or 
before July 2, 1983. 
12. The attempted exercise of the paragraph 4.b. option 
under the Real Estate Contract by Colman (and Defendants) on July 
2, 1984 was an invalid exercise of that option right and is, 
therefore, void and of no effect. 
13. The said Warranty Deeds from Royalty Investment 
Corporation to Defendants on the Anderson Ranch effected a valid 
conveyance of the Anderson Ranch by Royalty Investment Corporation) 
to Defendants. i 
14. An order should enter admitting Exhibits- 28, 54, 55 and j 
56 in evidence, 7^^- tfc 
15. Possession of trie Anderson Ranch should b£^delivered to^>Vf 
Plaintiff. 
16. Though the Court finds that the applicable burden of ] 
proof upon Plaintiff is a preponderance of the evidence, the Courtj 
concludes that Plaintiff has sustained his burden of proving his < 
claims against Defendants and Third-Party Defendants in this case J 
by clear and convincing evidence. I 
9^2 
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17. Plaintiff's pleadings should be amended to conform in 
all respects to Plaintiff's theories, arguments and evidence 
presented at trial. 
LET JUDGMENT ENTER ACCp^DINGLY^ 
'
L
 1986. DATED t h i s ^7 -^ day o] 
L Oiner J . Ca 
D i s t r i c t Jiidjg'e 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to Defendants1 Attorney, 
E. Craig Smay, at 208 Kearns Building, 136 South Main, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101; and to Third-Party Defendant, William J. Colman, 
at 1935 South Main, Suite 301, Salt Lake City, Utah 84105, postage 
prepaid in Logan, Utah, this day of July, 1986. 
X^/jLtcfZ 
L. Brent Hoggan 
WLF/26 
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L. Brent Hoggan 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
56 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
ERNEST J. MILLER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
JOHN D. ARCHER and ELIZABETH 
B. ARCHER, both individually and 
as Trustees for the Elizabeth 
Daly Archer Trust, and HUBERT 
WOLFE, JUDY W. WOLFE, and ELLIOTT 
WOLFE, as Trustees for Elliott 
Wolfe Trust No. 701, 
Defendants. 
JOHN D. ARCHER and ELIZABETH 
B. ARCHER, both individually and 
as Trustees for the Elizabeth 
Daly Archer Trust, and HUBERT 
WOLFE, JUDY W. WOLFE, and ELLIOTT 
WOLFE, as Trustees for Elliott 
Wolfe Trust No. 701, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WILLIAM J. COLMAN, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
Civil No. 21692 
•iNrttmber . .^l^JAJi. 
Fii.T AUG1 ! 1336 
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THIS MATTER having come on for trial before the 
above-entitled Court, the Honorable Omer J. Call, District Judge, 
presiding and sitting without a jury, on September 18, 19, 20, 27, 
October 3, November 14, and December 17, 1985; and Plaintiff 
having been represented by its counsel of record, L. Brent Hoggan, 
of Olson & Hoggan, the Defendants having been represented by their 
counsel of record, E. Craig Smay, and the Third-Party Defendant 
having been represented by himself; and the Court having heard 
testimony from witnesses for all the parties hereto during the 
trial hereof and having received certain exhibits offered by the 
parties as evidence in the matter; and the Court having received 
trial briefs from counsel for both Plaintiff and the Defendants on 
the primary issues before the Court, and having reviewed the 
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment prepared by Plaintiff and the 
Defendants1 Objections thereto, and the Court having heretofore 
made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT 
IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
!• Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure No, 15, and on 
Plaintiff's motion at trial, the Plaintiff's Complaint is deemed 
amended to conform to the evidence and Plaintiff's arguments at 
trial, specifically including but not limited to quieting title to 
the Anderson Ranch with regard to Colman's (and Archer and 
Wolfe1s) attempted exercise of the 4.b. option one (1)-year after 
this litigation commenced, Plaintiff's claim to the accruing 
interest on the tender money, and Plaintiff's request that the 
Option, Real Estate Contract, Waiver and Release and the Complaint 
herein be reformed to reflect the correct legal description of the 
Anderson Ranch. 
2. The Court declares that the recorded Option, Real Estate 
Contract and Waiver and Release are valid agreements, binding on 
all parties thereto, and fully enforceable by Plaintiff as the 
-3-
proper assignee of Colmanfs Option on the Anderson Ranch and 
all appurtenant water rights. 
3. Plaintiff is the owner and holder of the Option, the 
Option is declared irrevocable, and by virtue of Plaintiff's 
proper exercise of the Option and Plaintiff's tender on July 1, 
1983 of the purchase price provided in the Option, the Option is 
specifically enforced and title to the Anderson Ranch situated in 
Cache County, Utah and described as follows: 
Parcel 1: The Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter; 
the South half of the Northeast quarter; the Southeast 
quarter of the Northwest quarter; the East half of the 
Southeast quarter; the Northwest quarter of the Southwest 
quarter of Section 26; the North half of the Northwest 
quarter; the Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter of 
Section 25; the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter; 
the Northeast quarter of the Southeast quarter; the Southwest 
quarter of the Southeast quarter; the South half of the 
Southwest quarter of Section 24; the Southeast quarter of the 
Southeast quarter of Section 23; in Township 10 North, Range 
3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; Lots 2, 3 and 4; the 
Southeast quarter of the Southwest quarter; the Southwest 
quarter of the Southeast quarter; and the Northeast quarter 
of the Southeast quarter of Section 19, Township 10 North, 
Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
Parcel 2: The West half of the Southeast quarter and the 
East half of the Southwest quarter of Section 26, Township 10 
North, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Parcel 3: The Northeast quarter; the Southeast quarter of 
the Northwest quarter; the Northeast quarter of the Southwest 
quarter; the Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter of 
Section 19, the East half of the Northeast quarter; and the 
North half of the Southeast quarter of Section 30, in 
Township 10 North, Range 4 East of the Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. Also the Southwest quarter of Section 25, and the 
Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of Section 26, 
Township 10 North, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
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Parcel 4: The West half of the Northeast quarter; the 
Northeast quarter of the Northwest quarter; and the Southeast 
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quarter of the Southwest quarter; of Section 30, Township 10 
North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Containing 1840.14 acres, more or less, subject to existing 
rights of way. 
Together with -all water rights appurtenant to the above-
described property. 
is hereby vested and quieted in Plaintiff free and clear of 
all right and claim by Defendants, Royalty Investment Corporation 
or Colman and any claiming by, under or through Defendants, 
Royalty Investment Corporation or Colman. 
4. The $650,000.00 deposited by Plaintiff with the Clerk of 
the Court is declared to be payment in full by Plaintiff to 
Defendants for the Anderson Ranch. The Clerk of the Court is 
authorized and directed to deliver to Defendants on their request 
the $650,000.00 principal. 
5. All interest accrued on the $650,000.00 deposited by 
Plaintiff with the Clerk of the Court is declared to be the 
property of Plaintiff and the Clerk of the Court is authorized and 
i,! directed to deliver all such accrued interest to Plaintiff on his | 
ll request. 
I| 6. The legal description in the Option (recorded in Book 310 
li at Page 144 of the records of the Cache County, Utah Recorder) in , 
the Real Estate Contract (recorded in Book 310 at Page 147 of the 
records of the Cache County, Utah Recorder) in the Waiver and i 
Release (recorded in Book 315 and Page 658 of the records of the 
I Cache County, Utah Recorder), as well as in the Verified Complaint 
filed by the Plaintiff herein, are each and all reformed to show 
1
 Parcel 3 situated in Township 10 North, rather than Township 10 
jj South. ! 
'' 7. That possession of the Anderson Ranch, described above, 
is hereby delivered to Plaintiff free and clear of any claim, « 
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possessory or otherwise, of Defendants, Third-Party Defendants 
and Royalty Investment Corporation, or any claiming by, under or 
through Defendants and/or Third-Party Defendants and/or Royalty 
Investment Corporation, 
8. The attempted exercise of the paragraph 4.b. option under 
the Real Estate Contract by Colman (and Archer and Wolfe) on July 
2, 1984 is declared by the Court to be an invalid exercise of that 
option right. The agreement and any assignments or conveyances of 
whatsoever nature between Colman and the Defendants related 
thereto are hereby declared void and of no effect as to the 
parties herein; and full, undivided title in fee simple to the 
Anderson Ranch is hereby quieted in Plaintiff as against any and 
all claims or rights of Defendants, Third-Party Defendants and 
Royalty Investment Corporation, or any claiming by, under or 
through Defendants and/or Third-Party Defendants and/or Royalty 
Investment Corporation. j 
9. The Plaintiff1s Motion For Partial Summary Judgment and 
Motion To Strike are rendered moot by this Judgment and Decree, 
which effectively grants the partial relief sought by those 
motions but which is based on the entire trial record. 
10. The Defendants1 Cross-Motion For Partial Summary 
Judgment is denied. Defendants1 Counterclaim against the 
Plaintiff and Defendants' Third-Party Complaint against Colman are 
dismissed with preiudice. 
11. That Exhibits 28, 54, 55 and 56 are admitted in / / y f 
evidenced u /i>.'J>^\f?*^« ^ ^ ' l ^ t < 1 ^ l ^rflc 0 i ti\1 ^ < ^ u ^ 
12. The parties shall bear their own respective attorney1s 
fees, but Plaintiff jLs awarded his court costs incurred herein. 
DATED this /» day of -*&3/, 1986. - I 
Omer J. Call " 
District Judges 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing 
Judgment and Decree to Defendants1 Attorney, E. Craig Smay, at 208 
Kearns Building, 136 South Main, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101; and 
to Third-Party Defendant, William J, Colman, at 1935 South Main, 
Suite 301, Salt Lake City, Utah 84105, postage prepaid in Logan, 
Utah, this %*~ day of July, 1986. 
/^/^U^f 
L. Brent Hoggan 
WLF/28 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a certified copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law and Judgment and Decree to 
L. Brent Hoggan, Olson & Hoggan, Attorneys for Plaintiff, 56 West Center, 
P. 0. Box 525, Logan, Utah 84321; E. Craig Smay at 208 Kearns Building, 
136 South Main, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 and to Third-Party Defendant, 
William J. Colman, at 1935 South Main, Suite 301, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84105, postage prepaid in Brigham City, Utah, this 7th day of August, 
1986. 
Mary C. Holmgren-Deputy 
EXHIBIT V 
AFFIDAVIT 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
WILLIAM J* COLMAN, being first duly swornr on oath 
deposes and says: 
1. I am the President of Owanah Oil Company and I am 
also President of Royalty Investment Company. I maintain 
offices at 1935 South Mainf Suite 301, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84115. The companies with which I am affiliated are among the 
developers of a salt project at the Carson Sink in Churchill 
County, Nevada. 
2. In the fall of 1981, I had occasion to discuss 
with John D. Archer the urgency of my obtaining money to 
carry on the Carson Sink project. Mr. Archer told me that he 
and a friend of his, Elliott Wolfe, might be willing to make 
$500,000 available to the project if the deal could be 
structured so that they would be certain to get a 20% return 
on their money over a one year period. I told Mr. Archer 
that I could secure any deal we made with the Anderson Ranch 
in Cache County, Utah. 
3. Shortly after our first conversation, Mr. Archer 
came back to me and told me he was satisfied with the 
Anderson Ranch as security, but that he wanted to structure 
the arrangement so that he and Wolfe could get the greatest 
possible tax advantage from letting my companies use their 
-2-
money. He proposed that we set up a limited partnership, 
that he and Wolfe contribute $250,000 to the limited 
partnership which would be used for intangibles at the Carson 
Sink so that he and Wolfe could take the intangibles as an 
expense, and that he and Wolfe buy the Anderson Ranch for 
$250,000 and give me an option to repurchase it for $600,000 
within one year. Archer told me that the best way to avoid 
IRS investigation of the deal would be to space the 
individual transactions over some significant time. I told 
him I had no quarrel with our handling the deal the way he 
wanted to, and I would have my attorney draft the necessary 
papers. 
4. In September or early October, 1981, I asked 
my lawyer, Frank J. Allen, to prepare the necessary documents 
for the limited partnership, the ranch purchase, and the 
option back, and he prepared those documents. 
5. Archer, Wolfe and I met with Mr. Allen at his. 
office sometime in October, 1981. Mr. Allen told Mr. Archer 
and Mr. Wolfe that he could not advise them with respect to 
the tax implications of the deal we were making, but he 
reviewed with us the limited partnership certificate and 
agreement, the Anderson Ranch purchase documents, and the 
option for my repurchase of the Anderson Ranch. We decided 
to give me an extra 6 months to repurchase the ranch so we 
increased the option price from $600,000 to $650,000 
-3-
so that Archer and Wolfe would realize a 20% return on their 
money over 18 months instead of just one year. 
6. All of the papers for the three transactions which 
made up our total deal were completed before we ever signed 
the limited partnership agreement and it was agreed that the 
ranch purchase instruments would be dated about 3 months 
after the limited partnership certificatef and the option 
about three months after the purchase. Archer and Wolfe 
acknowledged that they had received the consideration for the 
option because that was a part of the total deal we had made. 
The whole concept of our agreement was that Archer and Wolfe 
would realize a 20% return on a $500f000 investment and would 
be able to show that return as capital gain as well as show 
$250,000 as expenses in 1981 and 1982. 
7. Neither Archer nor Wolfe ever asked for the 
$5f000.00 which is the recited consideration for the option 
until several months after the date which appears on the 
option instrument. Mr, Archer then said he and Wolfe had 
never received the $5,000.00 and I told them they had 
acknowledged receiving it because that was part of the 
consideration for my entering into the deal with them. I 
never received any written demand or notice that they 
considered the option void. 
8. The reason certain signature lines on the Option 
are left blank is that Wolfe and Archer represented to me and 
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Frank Allen that they had full authority to execute any and 
all documents for their respective family trusts and that the 
additional signatures of co-trustees were not required. I 
relied on those representations in making the deal. 
Dated this >~ day of Mayf 1983. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 
May, 1983. 
My commission expires: Notary Puolic 
Nov. 14, 1984 Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
Z17 
